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THE RIGHT TO CouNsEL IN AMERICAN CotmTs. By William M. Beaney. 
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 1955. Pp. 268. $4.50. 
The Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution provides, inter alia, that 
an accused in a criminal proceeding "shall enjoy the right . • • to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defense." For almost a century and a half after 
its ratification, this provision received only negative application, i.e., the federal 
courts could not preclude a defendant in a criminal trial from retaining counsel 
if he so desired. On the other hand, his voluntary failure to do so because of 
financial or other considerations, raised no constitutional issue. 
However, in 1938 the case of Johnson v. Zerbst1 reached the Supreme Court 
where the issue as to whether the failure to appoint counsel was a jurisdictional 
defect in the constitutional sense was directly posed. Despite a dearth of prece-
dent, the Court, speaking through Justice Black, held that ''The Sixth Amend-
ment withholds from federal courts, in all criminal proceedings, the power and 
authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty unless he has or waives 
the assistance of counsel."2 That decision reflected a substantial broadening of 
the concept of what constitutes a fair trial and serves as the bellwether of Dr. 
William M. Beaney's detailed and intelligent study of a suddenly pertinent 
constitutional safeguard. 
The decision in Johnson v. Zerbst, like that in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 
decided in the same year, was unexpected. Outside of some isolated dicta in 
several cases involving mob-dominated trials,3 only Powell v. Alabama4 stood 
between the Court and a total lack of precursory decisions. However, the com-
pelling and eloquent language of Justice Sutherland in that case, obiter dicta 
1 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019 (1938). 
21a. at 463. 
s See Holmes' dissent in Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 35 S.Ct. 582 (1915); 
Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 43 S.Ct. 265 (1923); Downer v. Dunaway, 53 F. (2d) 
586 (5th Cir. 1931). 
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though much of it may be, did much to construct a suitable springboard for 
the Johnson majority. 
Powell 11. Alabama, popularly known as the Scottsboro case, involved the 
trials, for rape, of nine Negro defendants, eight of whom were convicted in 
four separate trials which occurred on the very day of arraignment. No attorney 
answered or appeared for the defendants, except that a Tennessee attorney by 
the name of Roddy volunteered to assist court-appointed counsel. After some 
desultory attempts by the trial court to enlist the entire local bar on behalf of 
the defendants, all of whom were illiterate and youthful, an aging, half-hearted 
Scottsboro attorney volunteered to help Roddy. Appeals to the Alabama 
Supreme Court were denied in seven of the convictions, the exception being 
that of a thirteen-year-old defendant. 
The United States Supreme Court sustained the appellants' contention that 
there had been a denial of due process because "in a capital case, where the 
defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable adequately of making 
his own defense because of ignorance •.. , illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of 
the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary 
requisite of due process of law, and that duty is not discharged by an assign-
ment at such time or under such circumstances as to preclude the giving of 
effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case."5 
Sutherland's definition of "ignorance"6 was so broad that it in effect placed 
every layman in the category of the Scottsboro defendants. Dr. Beaney, with 
the omniscience of hindsight, is quick to recognize the sweeping implications 
of Sutherland's gratuitous remarks about the plight of unaided defendants in 
criminal cases. Such implications were, however, not perceived by many of the 
contemporary writers. 7 
Six years later Johnson v. Zerbst reached the Court. This case had its origin 
in November of 1934 when two Marines were arrested in South Carolina and 
charged with uttering counterfeit notes. With the exception of an attorney 
who represented them at their preliminary hearing before a United States 
Commissioner, they were without counsel for all subsequent proceedings. Two 
days after their indictment, the defendants were tried, convicted and sentenced 
to four and one-half years in jail. Several months later, they petitioned for a 
writ of habeas corpus,8 basing their contention on the fact that they had neither 
been offered counsel by the trial court nor been advised that they were entitled 
to a court appointment. Furthermore, they claimed that they had asked the 
United States attorney to obtain counsel for them but that he had refused on 
the ground that such a practice did not prevail in South Carolina in non-
capital cases. In denying their application, the district court held that despite 
~ 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55 (1932). 
11 1d. at 71. 
6Jd. at 69. 
7 18 lowA L. lli!v. 383 (1933); 21 CALIF. L. lli!v. 484 (1933). 
s Bridwell v. Aderhold, (D.C. Ga. 1935) 13 F. Supp. 253. 
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the fact that petitioners had been "deprived of their constitutional rights,"9 it 
was compelled to reach an adverse decision solely because they had chosen an 
improper remedy. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court, but 
insisted that its obiter dictum with reference to the duty of the trial court to 
provide counsel in every federal criminal proceeding whether requested or not 
was unsupported decisionally.10 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that 
'The Sixth Amendment withholds from federal courts, in all criminal proceed-
ings, the power and authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty unless 
he has or waives the assistance of counsel."11 
Thus, without having to overturn a substantial body of decisional law, the 
Court was able to raise the right to counsel in federal courts to a level which 
it had never even remotely attained since the ratification of the Bill of Rights. 
Black went even further and suggested that the trial record would have 
to contain evidence of a positive character with reference to waiver in order 
to meet the requirements of the new rule he was enunciating. He did not 
attempt to particularize the nature of this evidence, but in a later case the 
Court held that a plea of guilty by a defendant who had not been informed 
of his right to counsel was not tantamount to waiver.12 Further conjecture, 
however, became academic in view of rule 44 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, enacted in 1946 as a direct result of Johnson 11. Zerbst13 which 
requires that defendants be advised by the court of their right to counsel and 
that they must be supplied with legal assistance if they are indigent unless 
they elect otherwise. 
On the state level, the problem still remains acute in view of the inapplica-
bility of the Sixth Amendment to state court proceedings.14 All states provide 
counsel for poor defendants in capital cases but very few do so in less serious 
proceedings, and those that do insist upon an express request by the accused. 
It is here that Dr. Beaney is obviously most concerned and he does an extremely 
competent job in tracing the impact and effect of the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment in this area. In this con~ection, he makes refer-
ence again to Powell 11. Alabama whose reasoning, he feels, should have been 
immediately extended to include all criminal proceedings, not merely those 
involving capital crimes. 
That it was not is a source of keen disappointment to him. The Supreme 
Court has refused to apply Sutherland's standard in all noncapital cases unless 
9Jd at 255. 
10 Johnson v. Zerbst, (5th Cir. 1937) 92 F. (2d) 748 at 751. 
11 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 at 463, 58 S.Ct. 1019 (1938). 
12Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 61 S.Ct. 574 (1941). 
13 Walker v. Johnston, supra note 12, and Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 
S.Ct. 457 (1942) were also influential. 
14 See Massey v. Moore, (5th Cir. 1953) 205 F. (2d) 665. 
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the record indicated other prejudicial circumstances such as the extreme youth-
fulness of the defendant15 or material judicial errors.16 As Justice Roberts put 
it in Betts 11. Brady,17 a robbery case which reached the Court in 1942, it was 
only "in certain circumstances, or in connection with other elements" that a 
denial of a specific provision of the Bill of Rights was also a denial of due 
process.18 Therefore, the refusal of the trial court to appoint counsel as requested 
by Betts had to be "tested by an appraisal of the totality of facts in a given 
case."19 Accordingly, the Court held that the constitutional rights of a literate 
and intelligent defendant had not been violated by the lower court's action. 
Most of Dr. Beaney's treatise is written with scholarly detachment and he 
strives to maintain objectivity. However, his sensibilities are apparent through-
out and, in his concluding chapter, he cannot withhold his disapproval of the 
Supreme Court's reluctance to proceed to what he considers the logical limits of 
the Powell case, namely to require that counsel be available to indigent defend-
ants in any state criminal proceeding unless there is a positive waiver of this 
right. It does seem that a state defendant should not be in a worse position than 
his federal prototype and it is not difficult to agree in spirit with Dr. Beaney's 
thesis that anything less than the Johnson 11. Zerbst standard is a denial of due 
process. However, the cases are against him and there is no indication of any 
significant change in the offing.20 
Although he expends very few pages on the methods of selecting counsel, 
Dr. Beaney is convinced that, with rare exceptions, an indigent defendant has 
to be content with young and inexperienced counsel in all but those capital 
cases where the publicity is enough to attract leading members of the bar. He 
feels that it is too early to determine whether the legal aid societies which have 
proved so effective in New York City and Philadelphia, or the California public 
defender plan will furnish a universal solution to the problem. Perhaps the 
New Jersey system which provides for the rotation of attorneys from local bar 
association rosters is the right answer. The author does not advocate one method 
over another but he does suggest that immediate and extensive consideration of 
the entire situation is urgently needed. Even if the Supreme Court does not 
hold that every indigent defendant facing trial in a state court must, in the 
15 See Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 68 S.Ct. 1270 (1948). 
16 See Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 68 S.Ct. 1252 (1948) (facetious remarks 
during sentencing); Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 68 S.Ct. 1256 (1948) (misinterpre-
tation of Pennsylvania Habitual Criminal Act). 
11316 U.S. 455, 62 S.Ct. 1252 (1942). 
1s Id. at 462-463. 
19 Id. at 462. 
20See Bute v. lliinois, 333 U.S. 640, 68 S.Ct. 763 (1948); Quicksall v. Michigan, 
339 U.S. 660, 70 S.Ct. 910 (1950); Baker v. Jamison, 72 S.D. 638, 38 N.W. (2d) 441 
(1949); Ex Parte Johnson, 153 Tex. Cr. 619, 224 S.W. (2d) 240 (1949); Robinson v. 
Smyth, 190 Va. 724, 58 S.E.. (2d) 4 (1950). 
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absence of an express waiver, be provided with counsel, it should insist that 
those entitled to representation be assigned competent and interested attorneys. 
William M. Kunstler, 
Associate Professor of Law, 
New York Law School 
